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1 Introduction
Standard no-arbitrage pricing theory asserts that spot and futures prices must converge at
expiration. Nevertheless, during 2004-2009 traders observed significantly higher expiring
futures prices for corn, wheat, and soybeans on the CBOT compared to the spot price of the
physical grains. As shown in Figure 1, the unprecedented differential between cash and futures
prices reached its apex in 2006, where at the height of the phenomenon, CBOT corn futures
had surpassed spot corn prices by almost 30%! In the literature, Adjemian et al. (2013) and
Aulerich et al. (2011) reported that on July 1, 2008, the price for a July 2008 CBOT wheat
futures contract closed at $8.50 per bushel. On the other hand, the corresponding cash price
in the Toledo, Ohio delivery market was only $7.18 per bushel, a price differential of $1.32/bu
(+15%). Irwin et al. (2009) first coined the term “non-convergence” for this phenomenon of
observed positive premium, which recurred persistently from 2004 onwards. According to
their study, “performance has been consistently weakest in wheat, with futures prices at
times exceeding delivery location cash prices by $1.00/bu, a level of disconnect between cash
and futures not previously experienced in grain markets.”
However, a small difference between expiring futures and cash prices does not necessarily
imply a market failure. Before expiration, futures and cash prices may differ due to the
convenience yield, storage costs, or financing costs. Upon expiration, if cash prices are
lower/higher than futures prices, then arbitrageurs may profit from trading simultaneously in
the spot and futures markets. If sufficient numbers of arbitrageurs engage in these trades, they
will drive cash and futures prices to convergence at expiration. In fact, the futures expiration
date and delivery date may also differ. After the last trade date, the exchange contacts the
longest outstanding long who is notified of his obligation to undertake delivery. Before the
month’s end, the delivery instrument is then exchanged at the settlement price between long
and short parties. Therefore, since the delivery process does not occur immediately after the
last trade date, cash and futures prices might still differ by a spread called the basis. In this
paper, we use the following definition for the basis:
basis = futures price - spot price.
Figure 1 displays the basis time series associated with the expiring futures on soybeans and
corn.
Since the short party may choose the location and time to deliver, Biagini and Bjork
(2007) posit that futures price should be biased below the spot price on the last trade date.
However, their theoretical model would yield the opposite of the empirical observations in
the grain markets. In fact, the positive basis in the CBOT grain markets between 2004-2009
were too large to have been caused by the small inefficiencies of the delivery process. This
motivates us to investigate the factors that drive the non-convergence phenomenon.
In order to explain the positive premium, one must turn to embedded long-side options in
the futures. Long-side options in futures markets depend totally on the idiosyncrasies of each
commodity’s exchange traded structure. The survey paper by Carmona and Coulon (2013)
demonstrates the appropriate model for a commodity varies highly depending on storability,
instantaneous utility, and alternatives. At expiration, a CBOT agricultural futures contract
does not deliver the physical grains but an artificial instrument called the shipping certificate
that entitles its holder to demand loading of the grains from a warehouse at any time.
Before exercising the option to load, the holder must pay a fixed storage fee to the storage
company,1 as stipulated in the certificate. Since the storage capacity of grain elevators is
1Only a small number of storage companies that have contracts with the futures exchange are allowed to issue
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Figure 1: Time series of basis for soybeans (left) and corn (right) futures. During
2004-2009, the expiring futures price tends to be significantly higher than the spot
price.
limited and expensive, the number of grain elevators is fixed to a minimum necessary to
efficiently carry out transfers of grain from one transport system to another.2 Thus, like
a fractional-reserve banking system, shipping certificates alleviate the congestion of grain
elevators by only keeping enough grain on hand to satisfy instant withdrawal demand. A
detailed explanation on the structure of the shipping certificate market can be found in
Aulerich et al. (2011) and Garcia et al. (2014).
In this paper, our storage differential hypothesis posits that when the certificate storage
rate is sufficiently low, investors will pay a premium for the certificate over the spot grain
in order to save on storage cost over time, resulting in non-convergence of futures and spot
prices. When the storage cost of the certificate is set lower than the true storage cost paid
by the regular firm, the regular firm will cease to issue the unprofitable shipping certificates.
Since shipping certificates can only be issued by a set number of regular firms with limited
inventories, the market cannot issue certificates with lower fixed storage rates to keep the
market flowing. Instead, since the supply of certificates remains fixed, the value of existing
shipping certificates will be bid up in the secondary market, resulting in a premium over the
spot price. On the other hand, during periods where the certificate storage rate is set much
higher than the market storage rate, the certificate should not command any premium over
the spot because agents would exercise and store at the lower market rate. Therefore, as
shown by Aulerich et al. (2011), large quantities of certificates remaining unredeemed under
the storage differential hypothesis becomes a strong predictor of non-convergence. In fact, in
2009 under mounting evidence that storage differentials were responsible for non-convergence,
the CBOT raised the certificate storage rate for wheat, after which non-convergence decreased
significantly.3 This observation is consistent with our findings in this paper.
Let us point out an alternative explanation for non-convergence even though it is not
the approach in this paper. The speculator hypothesis for non-convergence postulates that
large long positions held by commodity index traders (CITs) have made it impossible for
arbitrageurs to carry sufficient grain forward to drive terminal prices to convergence (see
shipping certificates. They are also called the regular firms in the industry.
2See http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CBOT/II/11/11.pdf
3http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/reportofthesubcommitteeonconve.
pdf
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Tang and Xiong (2012) an example of the effects of excess speculation). While the speculator
hypothesis is plausible, empirical studies by Garcia et al. (2014) and Irwin et al. (2011) found
no evidence that rolling or initiation of large positions by index funds had contributed to an
expansion of the basis. In this paper, we illustrate mathematically how the non-convergence
phenomenon can arise under rational no-arbitrage models with stochastic storage rates.
We propose two new models that incorporate the stochasticity of the market storage
rate and capture the storage option of the shipping certificate by solving two optimal timing
problems, namely, to exercise the shipping certificate and subsequently liquidate the physical
grain. First, we propose the Martingale Model whereby the spot price minus storage cost is
a martingale while the stochastic storage rate follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process.
In addition, we present a second model in which the stochastic storage rate is a determin-
istic function of the spot price that follows an exponential OU (XOU) process. Among our
results, we provide explicit prices for the shipping certificate, futures prices, and the basis
size under a two continuous-time no-arbitrage pricing models with stochastic storage rates.
By examining the divergence between expiring futures prices and corresponding spot prices,
we derive the timing option generated by the differential between the market storage rate
and the constant storage rate stipulated in the shipping certificate, which explains the non-
convergence phenomenon in agricultural commodity markets. We also fit our model prices
to market data and extract the numerical value of the embedded timing option.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the
subject of non-convergence for agricultural futures. In Section 3, we discuss a martingale
spot price model with an OU stochastic storage rate, and derive the certificate price as well
as the optimal exercise and liquidation timing strategies. In Section 4, we analyze a shipping
certificate valuation model with a local stochastic storage rate and an exponential OU spot
price. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 Related Studies
The long history of the theory of storage dates back to Kaldor (1939) who argued that the
future price should reflect the spot price plus storage cost via a no-arbitrage relationship.
Johnson (1960) proposed an extension of Kaldor’s model which related inventories and hedg-
ing motivations to the intersection of futures and spot markets. However, in order to account
for possibly backwardated futures curves, Brennan (1958) and Working (1949) developed the
notion of a stochastic convenience yield, a fictitious dividend that accrues to the commodity
holder, but not the futures holder. Furthermore, Fama and French (1987) and Gorton et al.
(2012) found plenty of empirical evidence for the theory of storage by examining inventories
data. These authors not only created a theoretical basis for understanding commodity spot
and futures prices, but also empirically demonstrated the validity of the theory of storage
over a century.
Much of the literature on embedded options in futures contracts studies the short-side
options which lower the futures price below the spot price. For example, Hranaiova et al.
(2005) estimate the values of the delivery option, which allows the short to choose the location
of cheapest delivery. In addition, Biagini and Bjork (2007) compute model-free futures prices
for the short-side timing option. In contrast, our models explain how the futures price can be
higher than the spot price at maturity. Our proposed approach contributes to the theory of
storage as it provides a new link between the futures and spot markets through the storage
cost differential and the associated timing option. In a related study, Hinz and Fehr (2010)
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consider the impact of storage cost constraints on commodity options, but their model cannot
account for backwardated futures curves or non-convergence.
Aulerich et al. (2011) consider an alternative model in which non-convergence reflects the
value of an exchange option due to the scarcity of shipping certificate. They incorporate
a long-side option but not stochastic or differential storage rates. The exchange option
explanation is unsatisfactory because the exchange option is universal to all commodity
futures, while the non-convergence phenomenon is observed only in the grain markets. Our
approach identifies different storage rates between the certificate and real world as the driver
for non-convergence at maturity. Finally, instead of using a closed-form approximation for
the certificate price, we derive the explicit value of the shipping certificate under different
stochastic storage rate models.
The storage differential hypothesis is supported by several recent studies. Garcia et al.
(2014) and Adjemian et al. (2013) set up a discrete-time model and give conditions for the
number of shipping certificates in the market at equilibrium. While they identified the differ-
ence between the market and certificate storage rates as the crucial factor for non-convergence,
they did not compute the value of the shipping certificate. In this paper, we derive and com-
pute explicitly the prices of the futures and shipping certificate, and provide the necessary
and sufficient conditions for non-convergence. Furthermore, our approach requires only the
existence of the shipping certificate and no-arbitrage condition, and does not have specific
assumptions on the characteristics of market agents and their interaction.
The core mathematical problem within our stochastic storage models is an optimal double
stopping problem driven by a mean-reverting process. To this end, we adapt to our problem
the results developed by Leung et al. (2015) that study the optimal entry and exit timing
strategies when the underlying is an OU process. Other mean-reverting processes can also be
used to model the market storage rate so long as the corresponding optimal double stopping
problem can be solved analytically; see, e.g. Leung and Li (2015) and Leung et al. (2014)
for the cases with an exponential OU and Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) underlying, respectively,
and related applications to futures trading in Leung and Li (2016) and Leung et al. (2016).
3 Martingale Model with Stochastic Storage
We now discuss a futures pricing model for a single grain type, with the spot price process
(St)t≥0. The cost of physical storage is stochastic, represented by the rate process (δt)t≥0.
The spot price satisfies
dSt = (rSt + δt)dt+ σStdWt, (3.1)
where r is the positive risk-free rate, σ is the volatility parameter of spot grain, and W is
a standard Brownian motion under the risk-neutral measure Q. In this model, we assume
that the commodity is continuously traded, with units of the commodity constantly being
sold to pay the flat storage rate. Hence, the discounted spot price St net storage cost, i.e.
Mt := e
−rtSt −
∫ t
0 δe
−rudu, t ≥ 0, is a Q-martingale.
Note that δt is the net storage cost, which is the true storage cost minus the convenience
yield associated with owning the physical grain. Furthermore, the storage rate δt is quoted
in $/bushel, and not as a proportion of the commodity price. In the standard treatment of
storage rates, agents pay a proportion of the commodity price St per bushel i.e. δt = cSt.
However, since empirical storage rates are quoted in $/bushel and not as a percentage of the
crop, our specification of a flat storage rate δt is realistic and amenable for empirical analysis.
One can view the storage rate δt as a negative dividend rate on the commodity which the
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commodity holder pays but the futures holder does not. In our model, the storage cost δt
follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process
dδt = κ(ν − δt)dt+ ζdW˜t, (3.2)
where W˜ is a standard Brownian motion under Q, and is independent of W . The parameter
κ dictates the speed of mean-reversion for δt, ν is the average value of δt, and ζ is the
volatility of the storage rate δt. The parameters are required to satisfy the condition 2κ ≥ ζ.
The filtration F ≡ (Ft)t≥0 is generated by (St)t≥0 and (δt)t≥0. We let T be the set of all
F-stopping times, and Ts,u be the set of F-stopping times bounded by [s, u].
At time T , the T -futures contract expires, and the long party receives the shipping cer-
tificate. This certificate is perpetually lived and gives the holder an option to load out the
grain anytime, but the holder pays a constant storage rate δ̂ before exercising this option.
Note that δ̂ is a flat rate quoted in the futures contract, and thus must be positive. Since
the certificate holder does not possess the physical grain, and thus, cannot derive any con-
venience yield from it. After exercising, the certificate holder then stores at the market rate
δt until he chooses to liquidate the grain. We allow δt to be possibly negative to account for
the convenience yield. The fixed costs, c1 and c2 respectively, are incurred upon exercising
and liquidation of the grain.
The value of the shipping certificate can be obtained by solving two optimal timing
problems. First, suppose the agent has exercised at time t ≥ τ . The agent selects the
optimal time to liquidate the grains by solving4
J(St, δt) = sup
η∈Tt,∞
E
[
e−r(η−t) (Sη − c2)−
∫ η
t
δue
−r(u−t)du|Ft
]
.
Working backward in time, the value function J now serves an input for the optimal exercise
problem. The agent receives the shipping certificate at time T , and selects the optimal time
τ ≥ T to exercise the grains. Therefore, the agent’s value function at time T is
V (ST , δT ) = sup
τ∈TT,∞
E
[
e−r(τ−T ) (J(Sτ , δτ )− c1)−
∫ τ
T
δ̂e−r(u−T )du|FT
]
. (3.3)
Economically, we interpret J as the liquidation value of the commodity for an individual
who optimally times storage, and V as the price of the certificate (for an individual who can
choose between storage rates). Furthermore, since T = τ = η is always a valid stopping time
for (3.3), we must have
V (ST , δT ) ≥ ST − c1 − c2.
In the absence of transaction costs, the shipping certificate is valued higher than the grain
itself, and thus the certificate can be considered a long-side option. The value of the long-side
option is quantified with the basis: if T is the maturity of a futures contract, then the basis
w(ST , δT ) is the difference between futures and cash prices at maturity
w(ST , δT ) = V (ST , δT )− ST . (3.4)
As the shipping certificate, not the spot grain, is the true delivery instrument, the price
F (t, St, δt;T ) of a futures contract expiring at T satisfies the model-free price
F (t, St, δt;T ) = E[V (ST , δT )|Ft], t ≤ T. (3.5)
4Throughout this paper, the shorthand notation “sup” stands for “ess sup”. All computations in this paper are
assumed to be under Q, the risk-neutral measure.
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From this representation, it follows that the expiring futures price equals the certificate price
F (T, ST , δT ;T ) = V (ST , δT ).
Intuitively, the agent decides to liquidate when the spot price is sufficiently high. On
the other hand, the agent may decide to exercise for two reasons: first if the spot price is
sufficiently high, and second if the storage rate δt is sufficiently low relative to the certificate
rate δ̂. In the first case, the agent exercises and liquidates (i.e. τ∗ = η∗), and in the second
case, he exercises the shipping certificate but holds the commodity for longer, thus taking
advantage of the lower storage rate δt until the eventual liquidation.
The stochastic storage rate δt is a crucial factor for non-convergence. Indeed, if we instead
consider the simple constant storage rate (δt ≡ δ), then the certificate pricing problem (3.3)
simplifies to
V (ST , δT ) = sup
τ∈TT,∞ η∈Tτ,∞
E
[
e−r(η−T )Sη −
∫ τ
T
(δ̂ − (c1 + c2)r)e−r(u−T )du
−
∫ η
τ
(δ − c2r)e−r(u−T )du|FT
]
− c1 − c2.
(3.6)
By inspecting the value function in (3.6), we see that at every time t, the agent effectively
has a choice between paying the storage rate δ̂−(c1+c2)r and the storage rate δ−c2r. In other
words, the agent will immediately lock in the lesser of the two rates. If δ − δ̂ ≤ −c1r, then
the agent exercises immediately at expiration (τ∗ = T ). On the other hand, if δ − δ̂ > −c1r,
then the agent liquidates immediately after uploading (η∗ = τ∗). We recognize instantly
that under the assumption of constant storage rates at least one stopping time (τ∗ or η∗) is
trivial. Either the agent exercises immediately, or he liquidates after exercising. In particular,
this fact does not depend at all on the realized path of S. Therefore, a constant storage rate
model is insufficient since the shipping certificate is never used for storing the grain for a non-
trivial period of time. Since certificate holders empirically store and exercise in a multitude
of competitive markets, we must consider a stochastic storage rate δt in all our models.
In order to solve for J and V under the dynamics (3.1) and (3.2), we need to study an
ODE. Define the differential operator L ≡ La,b,c by
L = a(b− x) d
dx
+
1
2
c2
d2
dx2
, (3.7)
with the generic parameters (a, b, c) with a, c > 0 and b ∈ R. This is the infinitesimal generator
associated with an OU process. In turn, the ODE
Lf(x)− rf(x) = 0
has the two general classical solutions (see e.g. Borodin and Salminen (2002))
H(x; a, b, c) =
∫ ∞
0
v
r
a
−1e
√
2a
c2
(x−b)v− v2
2 dv, (3.8)
G(x; a, b, c) =
∫ ∞
0
v
r
a
−1e
√
2a
c2
(b−x)v− v2
2 dv. (3.9)
Direct differentiation yields that H ′(x) > 0, H ′′(x) > 0, G′(x) < 0 and G′′(x) > 0. Hence,
both H(x) and G(x) are strictly positive and convex, and they are, respectively, strictly
increasing and decreasing. Without ambiguity in this section, we denote H(δ) ≡ H(δ;κ, ν, ζ)
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and G(δ) ≡ G(δ;κ, ν, ζ) in this section. Alternatively, the functions F and G can be expressed
as
H(x; a, b, c) = exp
( a
2c2
(x− b)2
)
D−r/a
(√
2a
c2
(b− x)
)
,
G(x; a, b, c) = exp
( a
2c2
(x− b)2
)
D−r/a
(√
2a
c2
(x− b)
)
.
Here, the function D· is also known as parabolic cylinder function or Weber function, whose
properties are elaborated in detail by Erdelyi and Tricom (1953). The functions F and G
will play a crucial role in the solutions for V and J.
Proposition 1. Under the Martingale Model in (3.1) and (3.2), we have:
1. After the shipping certificate is exercised, it is optimal to never liquidate the grain, and
the value function J(St, δt) = St, for t ≥ T .
2. The value of the shipping certificate is given by
V (St, δt) = St+
1
κ+ r
(
δt − H(δt)
H ′(δ∗)
− δ̂ + κ(ν − δ̂)
r
)
1{δt ≥ δ∗}−c11{δt < δ∗}, (3.10)
for t ≥ T , where the unique optimal exercise threshold δ∗ solves the equation
δ∗ =
H(δ∗)
H ′(δ∗)
− c1(κ+ r) + δ̂ − κ(ν − δ̂)
r
. (3.11)
The optimal exercise and liquidation strategies are respectively given by
τ∗ = inf{ t ≥ T : δt ≤ δ∗ }, and η∗ =∞.
We observe from (3.10) that the shipping certificate value is separable in terms of the
terminal spot price ST and market storage rate δT at time T . As we can see in Figure 2, the
shipping certificate price V (ST , δT ) is increasing in both ST and δT , and always dominates
ST . When the market storage rate δT is below the critical level δ
∗ at time T , the shipping
certificate price is equal to the spot price ST , implying an immediate exercise by the holder.
In this model, the non-convergence or basis is determined by the market storage rate δT since
the exercise and liquidation strategies do not depend on ST at all.
In fact, the basis is roughly proportional to both the present value of the storage differ-
ential δT − δ̂ and the present value of the the average storage differential ν − δ̂. If δt < δ̂,
then the value of the certificate decreases because it is currently cheaper to store at the real
rate vs the certificate rate. Furthermore, if ν < δ̂, then the average storage rate is lower than
the certificate rate, so the value of the shipping certificate decreases. This model explicitly
states that agent must consider both the long-run storage differential ν− δ̂ and the immediate
storage differential δT − δ̂ in choosing his exercise strategy δ∗. In particular, when we set the
parameters ζ = 0, κ = 0 and ν = δ, the problem reduces to the case with a constant market
storage rate. In this case, the optimal exercise level becomes δ∗ = δ̂ − c1r, and the basis is
completely linearly proportional to the storage differential δ− δ̂. After exercising the shipping
8
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Figure 2: The shipping certificate price V (St, δt) as a function of spot price St and
market storage rate δt. Parameters are r = 0.03, c1 = 0, c2 = 0, κ = 0.3, ζ = 0.2,
ν = 0.07, δ̂ = 0.06. The optimal exercise level is δ∗ = 0.21.
certificate and thus receiving the grain, there is no benefit to sell the grain early (η∗ = ∞).
This is due to the martingale property of the spot price.
According to Proposition 1, the critical level δ∗ determines the time τ∗ to exercise the
shipping certificate, and thus, plays a role in the non-convergence of the futures at maturity.
Indeed, the higher the critical level δ∗, the more likely the agent will exercise the shipping
certificate at maturity, resulting in zero non-convergence. In contrast, a low δ∗ implies a high
likelihood of non-convergence at maturity. In fact, when c1 = 0, the basis w(ST , δT ) > 0 if
and only if δT > δ
∗.
Furthermore, the conditional probability that a T -futures contract expires with a strictly
positive basis is given by
Q(w(ST , δT ) > 0|Ft) = 1− Φ
(
z∗t,T
)
, (3.12)
where
z∗t,T =
δ∗ − ν¯t,T
ζ¯t,T
,
ν¯t,T = δte
−κ(T−t) + ν(1− e−κ(T−t)) ,
ζ¯2t,T =
ζ2
2κ
(
1− e−2κ(T−t)
)
,
(3.13)
and Φ is the standard normal cdf. In particular, the probability of a strictly positive basis
depends solely on the current storage rate δt and the long run parameters of (δt)t≥0. This
probability is completely independent of the realization St at any time t, or its driving
parameters r and σ! Furthermore, since non-convergence at maturity is undesirable behavior,
we would like to know precisely how the parameters of our model affect δ∗. Differentiating
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(3.11) with respect to δ̂, c1, and ν, respectively, we obtain the sensitivity in each of these
parameters.
dδ∗
dδ̂
= h(δ∗)
(
1 +
κ
r
)
≥ 0, dδ
∗
dν
= −h(δ∗)κ
r
≤ 0, dδ
∗
dc1
= −h(δ∗) (κ+ r) ≤ 0, (3.14)
where we have defined
h(δ∗) :=
H ′(δ∗)2
H(δ∗)H ′′(δ∗)
≥ 0.
The function h is positive because H is positive, increasing, and convex. Therefore, we de-
duce the properties of the optimal exercise threshold δ∗.
Corollary 1. Under the Martingale Model defined in (3.1) and (3.2), the optimal stopping
threshold δ∗ is increasing with respect to δ̂, but decreasing with respect to ν and c1.
Having solved the certificate pricing problem, we proceed to examine how the storage
optionality propagates to futures prices. At time T , the agent will exercise if storage rate δT
is lower than the critical level δ∗. Therefore, a higher δ∗ increases the chance an agent will
exercise the shipping certificate immediately upon the futures expiration. A higher certificate
storage rate δ̂ increases δ∗ and hence lowers the probability of non-convergence. On the other
hand, a higher average storage rate ν increases the probability of non-convergence. This
occurs due to the incentive to store in the cheaper market: if the certificate storage rate is
higher (resp. lower) than the market rate, then the agent will exercise sooner (resp. lower).
When calculating the derivatives in (3.14), the magnitude of each derivative is roughly
proportional to κ, the rate of mean reversion of the storage rate δt. Indeed, as κ increases,
the long run effect of ν dominates, acting as an amplifier on δ∗. Therefore, under higher κ, if
the storage differential ν− δ̂ is positive, the basis increases more, whereas if ν− δ̂ is negative,
the basis increases less. Intuitively, since the value c1 increases the agent’s cost to exercise, it
is expected, as seen in (3.14), that δ∗ is decreasing in c1. Lastly, after exercising, the agent’s
liquidation timing η∗ is trivial, so the liquidation cost c2 does not affect the exercise level δ∗.
Next, we compute the futures price using the shipping certificate price given in Proposition
1. It follows from the property of the OU process that δT |δt is normally distributed with
parameters ν¯t,T and ζ¯t,T which are given in (3.13). Following the definition in (3.5), the
futures price is given by
F (t, St, δt;T ) = E [ST |Ft] + 1
κ+ r
E
[(
δT − H(δT )
H(δ∗)
− δ̂ + κ(ν − δ̂)
r
)
1{δT ≥ δ∗}|Ft
]
− c1Q(δT < δ∗|Ft) .
By computing the conditional truncated expectations of ST and δT , we obtain an explicit
formula for the futures price.
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Corollary 2. Under the Martingale Model defined in (3.1) and (3.2), the grain futures price
is given by
F (t, St, δt;T ) = e
r(T−t)
[
St +
ν
r
(
1− e−r(T−t)
)
+
δt − ν
κ+ r
(
1− e−(κ+r)(T−t)
)]
+
1
κ+ r
ν¯t,T + φ
(
z∗t,T
)
1− Φ
(
z∗t,T
) ζ¯t,T − ∫ ∞
z∗t,T
H(ν¯t,T + ζ¯t,Tu)
H ′(δ∗)
φ(u)du
+
(
κ(ν − δ̂)
r
− δ̂
)(
1− Φ (z∗t,T ))
]
− c1Φ
(
z∗t,T
)
, t ≤ T, (3.15)
where z∗t,T , ν¯t,T and ζ¯t,T are given in (3.13), and φ and Φ are the standard normal pdf and
cdf respectively.
We note that like the shipping certificate prices, futures prices can be separated into an
expectation that depends on St and another involving δt. Despite the separation, since δt
appears in the diffusion for St, the two stochastic factors are not independent. The futures
price encapsulates a number of components: (i) the risk-neutral expectation of the future spot
price; (ii) expected future basis w(ST , δT ) (see (3.4)); and (iii) expected future exercise cost
c2. Thus, by accounting for the expected future basis resulting from the storage differential
δt− δ̂, the futures price for all t ≤ T in a market with shipping certificates carries a premium
over the price of a futures contract that delivers just the grain at time T . We therefore
demonstrate that anticipated future storage differentials can impact current futures prices,
including the contracts that are far from expiry.
With an understanding on the theoretical behavior of grain futures prices under the
Martingale Model, we now calibrate to empirical data, and discuss the results and economic
implications. We obtain futures prices from 2004-2011 for CBOT corn, wheat and soybeans
contracts using Bloomberg terminal. We obtain spot prices from 2004-2011 for CBOT corn,
wheat, and soybeans from an average of daily sale prices of several Illinois grain depots.5
We also obtain the empirical certificate storage rate δ̂, quoted in $/bushel, from the CBOT
website.6,7 For the interest rate in our model, we use the 3-month LIBOR rate observed on
the same date. There are several quoted prices for spot grain, differing only in the quality
of the grain. This quality option allows the short to choose the grade he wishes to deliver,
subject to some prior fixed conversion multiplier of the settlement price. In order to obtain
a single series of spot prices, for every time t we use the then cheapest-to-deliver price as the
spot price for grain.
Recall that the basis w(ST , δT ) is the premium of the certificate price V (T, ST ) over the
spot price ST . at time T . On the day t = 0, we have the empirical futures prices (Fk)
N
k=0
with maturities (Tk)
N
k=0, and a known spot price F0 = S0; we seek a model-consistent futures
curve Fk(ν, κ, ζ, δ0) for k = 0, 1, . . . , N which best fits the empirical futures prices, given
5http://www.farmdoc.illinois.edu/MARKETING/INDEX.ASP
6http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CBOT/II/$n$/$m$.pdfwhere$(n,m)\in\protect\T1\
textbraceleft(10,10),(11,11),(14,14)\protect\T1\textbraceright.$
7As a result of the certificate rate δ̂ increase in 2009, the size of the empirical basis became smaller afterward.
However, a large strictly positive basis can still manifest in the future if the market storage rate δt is significantly
higher than the new certificate rate δ̂.
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model parameters (ν, κ, ζ) and δ0, with the model futures prices given in (3.15). Under
this setup, the best fit calibrated futures curve F∗k for k = 0, 1, . . . , N minimizes the sum
of squared errors (SSE) between the empirical futures curve and the model futures curve.
Furthermore, the best-fit parameters are defined to be (ν∗, κ∗, ζ∗, δ∗0) the model parameters
which achieve the best fit futures curve. The other exogenous parameters (r, St, δ̂, c1, c2) are
directly determined via contract specifications. Precisely, the calibrated parameters and the
resulting futures curve are found from
(ν∗, κ∗, ζ∗, δ∗0) = arg min
ν,κ,ζ,δ0
N∑
k=0
(Fk − Fk(ν, κ, ζ, δ0))2
F∗k = ~F(ν
∗, κ∗, ζ∗, δ∗0) k = 0, 1, . . . N.
In Figure 3, we calibrate the Martingale Model to the corn futures prices on two dates
selected to show two characteristically different futures curves. On the left panel, the futures
curve is downward sloping. With the expiring futures price and spot price being $3.17 and
$2.81, respectively, a positive basis is observed. Intuitively, given that the current market
storage rate is higher than the certificate rate (δ∗0 > δ̂), the agent thus prefers the certificate
storage rate over the market rate and will wait to exercise the certificate, resulting in a positive
basis. The current storage rate δ∗0 is also higher than the estimated long-run storage rate ν∗.
Therefore, the model suggests that in the long run, a convenience yield will dominate, leading
to a downward sloping futures curve. In contrast, the right panel also reflects a positive basis,
but the futures curve is upward sloping.
Figure 4 displays the calibrated futures curves under the Martingale Model for wheat on
two dates when the futures market is in backwardation and contango, respectively. Again,
non-convergence is observed on each of these two dates as the expiring futures price dominates
the spot price. On the left panel, the futures curve is upward sloping while the right panel
shows that the futures curve is downward sloping. In this case, the current market storage rate
satisfies δ∗0 > δ̂, so it is optimal for the agent to continue to store at the lower certificate storage
rate. Hence, the value of the associated timing option to exercise the shipping certificate yields
a positive basis.
In addition, we consider the differences between the model futures curve and the futures
curve generated without considering the timing options. To be precise, let the ‘no certificate’
futures price ψ(t, St, δt;T ) be
ψ(t, St, δt;T ) = E[ST |Ft],
= er(T−t)
[
St +
ν
r
(
1− e−r(T−t)
)
+
δt − ν
κ+ r
(
1− e−(κ+r)(T−t)
)]
.
(3.16)
This follows from direct calculations and resembles the first line of (3.15). In Figure 3, we
plot the values of ψ(0, S0, δ
∗
0 ;Ti) for i = 0 . . . N, using the same fitted parameters from our
model (ν∗, κ∗, ζ∗, δ∗0) and the constraint that St = F0, the empirical terminal futures price.
In other words, we ignore the data on spot grain prices, so there is initially zero basis, as
would be the case under physical delivery, as opposed to receiving the shipping certificate
upon expiration. As expected, the model futures prices with shipping certificate dominate
the those without one, for all maturities. As seen in Figure 3, the premium of the shipping
certificate over the spot as the delivery item tends to be higher for longer maturities. Finally,
the Martingale Model fits both backwardated and upward-sloping futures curves well.
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Figure 3: Calibrating the Martingale Model to empirical corn futures prices. The x-axis
is time to maturity in months and the y-axis is the price of a bushel of corn in cents.
The ‘no certificate’ curve is taken from equation (3.16). We use the fitted parameters
from the ‘model’ curve as inputs for the ‘no certificate’ curve to illustrate the premium.
Fitted parameters: (left) ν∗ = −0.48, κ∗ = 0.0015, ζ∗ = 0.0161, and δ∗0 = 1.2532;
(right) ν∗ = 0.832, κ∗ = 0.021, ζ∗ = 0.428, and δ∗0 = 0.782. Other parameters are
r = 0.017, S0 = {282, 167} (cents), δ̂ = 0.55, and c1, c2 = 0.
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Figure 4: Calibrating the Martingale Model to empirical wheat futures prices. The
x-axis is time to maturity in months and the y-axis is the price of a bushel of wheat in
cents. The ‘no certificate’ curve is taken from equation (3.16). Fitted parameters: (left)
ν∗ = 0.91, κ∗ = 0.035, ζ∗ = 0.14, and δ∗0 = 0.871; (right) ν∗ = −0.22, κ∗ = 0.0032,
ζ∗ = 0.61, and δ∗0 = 1.44. We use the fitted parameters from the ‘model’ curve as inputs
for the ‘no certificate’ curve to illustrate the premium. Other parameters are r = 0.017,
S0 = {273, 772} (cents), δ̂ = 0.55, and c1, c2 = 0.
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Commodity Average Basis (pre) Max Basis (pre) Average Basis (post) Max Basis (post)
Corn 9.11% 27.52% 2.54% 13.50%
Soybeans 4.31% 12.96% 0.89% 5.61%
Wheat 1.32% 14.10% -0.97% 7.05%
Table 1: Basis summary during 2004-2014 before (pre) and after (post) CBOT intro-
duced new certificate policies to facilitate convergence in the corn, soybeans, and wheat
futures markets. For corn and soybeans futures, the policy changed in in January 2011.
For wheat contracts, a variable storage rate policy was introduced in July 2010. For
comparison across commodities, the basis here is computed in percentage at expiration
according to [(futures price/spot price)-1]×100%.
Our model postulates that the non-convergence occurs when the market storage rate is
significantly higher than the certificate storage rate. Therefore, if the two rates are brought
into alignment, we expect that the basis to diminish. Indeed, after years of high basis, the two
exchanges, CBOT and KCBOT, enacted a series of reforms on the wheat futures to address
the non-convergence phenomenon. During February 2009 to May 2011, both exchanges
instituted a one-time hike in the formerly constant storage rates, and subsequently adopted
a variable certificate storage rate for all wheat contracts, thus better aligning the certificate
and market storage rates. For corn and soybeans, the exchanges merely raised the constant
certificate storage rates once in Jan 2011. According to (3.12), these policy changes would
decrease the likelihood of non-convergence. In Table 1, we compare the average basis before
and after the policy implementation for each commodity. The average basis decreased by
6.57% for corn, 3.42% for soybeans, and 2.29% for wheat, suggesting that the effectiveness of
changing the certificate storage rate. In fact, the study by Aulerich and Hoffman (2013) finds
that introducing a variable certificate storage rate can significantly reduce non-convergence.8
4 Local Stochastic Storage Model
We now consider an alternative to the Martingale Model. Since the commodity cannot neces-
sarily be continuously traded, the market is incomplete, and one can specify a non-martingale
evolution for the commodity price under the no-arbitrage risk-neutral measure. Commodi-
ties have the unique property that production can be increased or decreased in response to
high or low prices, respectively. In addition, commodities can be consumed through produc-
tion of end-goods (for example, turning corn into ethanol). In times of scarcity, production
will increase to lower prices; in times of surplus, production will decrease while consump-
tion continues to increase prices. Thus, the production and consumption process unique to
commodities imply a mean-reverting price structure as suggested by Deaton and Laroque
(1996).
Hence, we propose an exponential OU (XOU) model for the spot price. Under the risk-
neutral measure Q, the log-spot price of the grain, denoted by Ut = logSt, follows the OU
process
dUt = α(µ− Ut)dt+ σdWt, (4.1)
8See also the CME Group report, “The Impact of Variable Storage Rates on Liquidity of the Deferred Month
CBOT Wheat Futures” in 2010.
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where W is standard Brownian motion under Q, µ is the long-run mean, α is the rate of
mean reversion, and σ is the volatility of the log-spot price. We impose the further regularity
condition that σ <
√
2α.
The market rate of storage δt is locally determined by the spot price through
δt = βUt + γ. (4.2)
We typically set the coefficient β ≥ 0 so that the storage cost increases linearly with the log-
price of the commodity, with a possibly flat storage rate γ > 0. In summary, we have described
a local stochastic storage approach, whereby the market storage rate in (4.2) is a function
of the stochastic spot price that follows the exponential OU model in (4.1). Henceforth, we
shall refer it as the XOU Model.
Denote by G ≡ (Gt)t≥0 the filtration generated by the log-spot price (Ut)t≥0. Also, let S
be the set of all G-stopping times, and Ss,u the set of G-stopping times bounded by [s, u].
Note that δt is a function of Ut, the optimal liquidation problem is given by
J(Ut) = sup
η∈St,∞
E
[
e−r(η−t) (exp(Uη)− c2)−
∫ η
t
δue
−r(u−t)du|Gt
]
,
which applies after the shipping certificate is exercised at time τ . The optimal timing problem
to exercise the shipping certificate is given by
V (UT ) = sup
τ∈ST,∞
E
[
e−r(τ−T ) (J(Uτ )− c1)−
∫ τ
T
δ̂e−r(u−T )du|GT
]
.
Since the shipping certificate serves as the delivery item instead of the actual grain, the
futures price F (t, Ut;T ) at t for the contract expiring at T is given by
F (t, Ut;T ) = E[V (UT )|Gt].
We now denote the operator from (3.7) by L ≡ Lα,µ,σ, which is the infinitesimal generator
for the OU process U . To solve for the certificate price and the agent’s optimal policy, we
solve the ODE
Lf(u)− rf(u) = 0,
which has the general solutions, H(u;α, µ, σ) and G(u;α, µ, σ), where L, H, and G are defined
in (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9). In this section, without ambiguity, we denote H(u) ≡ H(u;α, µ, σ)
and G(u) ≡ G(u;α, µ, σ), both of which will play a role in the solution for J and V.
Proposition 2. Under the XOU Model defined in (4.1) and (4.2):
1. The liquidation value is given by
J(u) =
{
AH(u)− 1α+r
[
βu+ γ + α(βµ+γ)r
]
if u < u∗,
eu − c2 if u ≥ u∗.
(4.3)
2. The certificate price is given by
V (u) =

eu − c1 − c2 if u > u∗∗,
BH(u) + CG(u)− δ̂r if u∗∗ ≤ u ≤ u∗∗,
AH(u)− 1α+r
[
βu+ γ + α(βµ+γ)r
]
− c1 if u < u∗∗,
(4.4)
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where
A =
eu
∗
+ βα+r
H ′(u∗)
,
B =
eu
∗∗
G′(u∗∗)−
(
AH ′(u∗∗)− βα+r
)
G′(u∗∗)
H ′(u∗∗)G′(u∗∗)−H ′(u∗∗)G′(u∗∗) ,
C =
eu
∗∗
H ′(u∗∗)−
(
AH ′(u∗∗)− βα+r
)
H ′(u∗∗)
H ′(u∗∗)G′(u∗∗)−H ′(u∗∗)G′(u∗∗) ,
and the optimal thresholds u∗, u∗∗ and u∗∗ satisfy the equations:
AH(u∗)− 1
α+ r
[
βu∗ + γ +
α(βµ+ γ)
r
]
= eu
∗ − c2 ,
BH(u∗∗) + CG(u∗∗)− δ̂
r
= eu
∗∗ − c1 − c2 ,
BH(u∗∗) + CG(u∗∗)− δ̂
r
= AH(u∗∗)− 1
α+ r
[
βu∗∗ + γ +
α(βµ+ γ)
r
]
− c1.
The optimal exercise and liquidation times, respectively, are given by
τ∗ = inf{ t ≥ T : Ut ≤ u∗∗ or Ut ≥ u∗∗ } ,
η∗ = inf{ t ≥ τ∗ : Ut ≥ u∗ } .
The liquidation value J(u) is entirely determined by the critical level u∗ at which the
agent will sell the physical grain. When the log-spot price Ut surpasses u
∗, both the storage
cost δt and spot price St will be high. Since the asset price is mean-reverting, intuitively
there is a potential advantage to early liquidation before the asset reverts back to a lower
value. In the holding region {u < u∗} corresponding to low spot prices, the agent pays the
present value of the storage rate βu + γ, and the present value of the average storage rate
βµ + γ. The conflict between increasing spot prices and higher storage rates, both of which
are driven by Ut, determines when the agent liquidates. Thus, both instantaneous storage
rates and the long-run storage rates affect the certificate price.
On the other hand, the certificate value V (u) is determined by two stopping levels: the
optimal exercise threshold u∗∗ and the optimal liquidation threshold u∗∗. When the spot price
surpasses u∗∗, the agent exercises and liquidates to take advantage of temporarily higher spot
prices, while avoiding higher storage rates. On the other hand, when the spot price decreases
below u∗∗, the agent exercises but does not liquidate, because he wants to take advantage
of a temporarily lower storage rate, storing in the real market at rate δt instead of at the
certificate rate δ̂. Recall that due to our specification of the optimal stopping times η∗ and
τ∗, the stopping levels satisfy u∗∗ ≥ u∗ ≥ u∗∗.
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Figure 5: Optimal stopping levels for [u∗∗, u∗, u∗∗], with default parameters r = 0.03,
Ut = log 5, γ = 0, δ̂ = 0.2, β = 0.08, c1 = 0, c2 = 0, µ = log 30, α = 0.1, σ = 0.2. We
vary the parameters β and δˆ respectively in these plots.
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Figure 6: Immediate value exp(u)− c1− c2, liquidation value J(u), and certificate price
V (u). The optimal stopping levels are given by u∗∗ = 0.337, u∗ = 3.485, u∗∗ = 3.534.
Parameters are r = 0.03, γ = 0, δ̂ = 0.17, β = 0.10, c1 = 0, c2 = 0, µ = log 30, α = 0.1,
σ = 0.2.
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Figure 5 further illustrates the dependence of the three stopping levels [u∗∗, u∗, u∗∗] on the
parameters β and δ̂. As β increases, the gap between u∗∗ and u∗∗ increases, so does the basis.
However, as β → 0, the market storage rate goes to 0 in this example, inducing the agent to
exercise as soon as the futures expires and store in the real market. Consequently, the region
{u∗∗, u∗∗} for holding the certificate vanishes, which also means that all three thresholds,
u∗∗, u∗, and u∗∗ converge to the same value representing the optimal level to liquidate the
grain. A similar pattern is observed when the certificate storage rate δ̂ increases since the
agent will again be incentivized to exercise the shipping certificate immediately to store in
the real market.
Figure 6 also reflects the relationship among the certificate price, liquidation value, and
payoff from immediate exercise and liquidation. Note that
V (u) ≥ J(u) ≥ exp(u)− c1 − c2,
i.e. the shipping certificate price dominates the liquidation value, which convexly dominates
the immediate exercise value. The liquidation value is significantly higher than the immediate
exercise value, especially as u → −∞. The value of J(u) does not decrease as much as
the immediate exercise value. Because the asset is mean reverting and the optionality is
perpetual, the asset value is almost guaranteed to be eventually profitable. In this model, the
ability to choose between two rates of storage adds merely a modest basis to the liquidation
value. With the parameters in Figure 5, the maximum percent difference between V (u) and
J(u) is 12.57%.
Recall that the basis w(Ut) is defined as the difference between certificate and spot prices
at maturity. As we established from a model-free argument, the basis w(Ut) ≥ 0. Therefore,
a positive basis occurs when the agent chooses a strategy which is different than exercising
and liquidating (η∗ > τ > T ). In this scenario, the agent either waits to exercise because
storage rates are too high to exercise and spot prices are too low to liquidate, or he has
exercised to take advantage of lower storage prices but the spot price is too low to liquidate.
In our model the probability of non-convergence depends completely on u∗∗. In particular, if
c1 = 0 and c2 = 0, then the basis w(UT ) > 0 iff UT < u
∗∗. Thus, the probability that there
is a strictly positive basis at time t for a contract maturing at T ≥ t is
Q (w(UT ) > 0 | Gt) = Φ
(
u∗∗ − µ¯t,T
σ¯t,T
)
,
where
µ¯t,T = Ute
−α(T−t) + µ(1− e−α(T−t)),
σ¯2t,T =
σ2
2α
(1− e−2α(T−t)).
(4.5)
Finally, in order to calibrate our model for empirical analysis, we derive futures prices by
taking an expectation of the certificate prices.
Under the OU model, the conditional log spot price UT |Ut is normally distributed with
parameters µ¯t,T and σ¯t,T given in (4.5). The result then follows from computing the associated
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conditional truncated expectations:
F (t, Ut;T ) = E
[(
eUT − c1 − c2
)
1{UT > u∗∗}|Ut
]
+ E
[(
BH(UT ) + CG(UT )− δ̂
r
)
1{u∗∗ ≤ UT ≤ u∗∗}|Ut
]
+ E
[(
AH(u)− 1
α+ r
[
βUT + γ +
α(βµ+ γ)
r
]
− c1
)
1{UT < u∗∗}|Ut
]
Corollary 3. The futures price F (t, Ut;T ) under the XOU Model defined in (4.1) and (4.2)
is given by
F (t, Ut;T ) = exp
(
µ¯t,T +
σ¯2t,T
2
)
Φ
(
σ¯t,T − z∗∗t,T
)
1− Φ
(
z∗∗t,T
) − (c1 + c2) (1− Φ (z∗∗t,T ))
+
∫ z∗∗t,T
z∗∗t,T
(BH(µ¯t,T + σ¯t,T v) + CG(µ¯t,T + σ¯t,T v))φ(v)dv
− δ̂
r
(
Φ
(
z∗∗t,T
)− Φ (z∗∗t,T ))+ ∫ z∗∗t,T
−∞
AH(µ¯t,T + σ¯t,T v)dv
− β
α+ r
µ¯t,T − φ
(
z∗∗t,T
)
Φ
(
z∗∗t,T
) σ¯t,T
− ( γ
α+ r
+
α(βµ+ γ)
r(α+ r)
+ c1
)
Φ
(
z∗∗t,T
)
,
where
z∗∗t,T =
u∗∗ − µ¯t,T
σ¯t,T
, z∗∗t,T =
u∗∗ − µ¯t,T
σ¯t,T
,
and µ¯t,T , and σ¯t,T are defined in (4.5).
We calibrate our model futures curve to empirical corn, wheat and soybeans data and
consider the accuracy and economic implications. Refer to Table 1 for details of each con-
tract’s specification. Consider the futures curve at time t = 0. Recall that the best-fit futures
curve can be defined in the following manner. Let the futures prices at time Tk be Fk, for
maturity times (Tk)
N
k=0, with F0 = exp(U0) = S0, so the futures price at T0 = 0 is just the
market quoted settlement price. Denote the model futures curve generated at time Tk by the
parameters (β, γ, µ, α, σ) be denoted Fk(β, γ, µ, α, σ).
The best fit futures curve F∗k for k = 0, 1, . . . , N minimizes the weighted sum of squared
errors (SSE) between the empirical futures curve and the model futures curve at time t.
Furthermore, the best-fit parameter is defined to be (β∗, γ∗, µ∗, α∗, σ∗) the model parameters
which achieve the best fit futures curve. The other exogenous parameters (r, Ut, δ̂, c1, c2) are
directly determined via contract specifications (see Table 1).
(β∗, γ∗, µ∗, α∗, σ∗) = arg min
β,γ,µ,α,σ
N∑
k=0
(Fk − Fk(β, γ, µ, α, σ))2
F∗k = Fk(β
∗, γ∗, µ∗, α∗, σ∗) k = 0, 1, . . . , N.
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The corn futures curves calibrated from the XOU Model are illustrated in Figure 7. We
have selected the two dates to illustrate two characteristically different futures curves. On
the left panel, the futures curve that is upward sloping. With the expiring futures price and
spot price being 317 and 281 (cents), respectively, a positive basis is observed. The current
storage rate δ∗0 = 106.00, and the long run storage rate β∗µ∗ + γ∗ = 89.55 are both higher
than the certificate rate δ̂. This storage rate spread leads to the positive basis, while the long
run storage rate anticipates a future basis. Furthermore, the current spot price U0 > µ
∗,
which indicates that the spot price will likely fall in the future, and results in a downward-
sloping futures curve. On the right panel, the futures curve is upward sloping and the basis
is more modest. The spot price current satisfies U0 < µ
∗, so the spot price is expected to rise
in the future, generating a more contango futures curve.
In Figure 8, we see the results of our empirical calibration under the XOU model for
wheat on two dates. The left panel shows a basis of around 12%, and the futures curve
is upward sloping. The current storage rate δ∗0 = 67.21, and the long run storage rate
β∗µ∗ + γ∗ = 69.84 are both higher than the certificate rate δ̂. Therefore, the current storage
rate leads to a positive basis, while the long run storage rate anticipates a future basis.
Furthermore, the current spot price U0 < µ
∗, which indicates that the spot price will likely
rise in the future, and results in an upward-sloping futures curve. In Figure 8 (right), the
basis is more modest at 5%, while the futures curve is downward sloping. The current
storage rate δ∗0 = 60.71, is higher than the certificate storage rate, but the long run storage
rate β∗µ∗ + γ∗ = 53.87 is lower than the certificate rate δ̂. Therefore, the current storage
rate generates a smaller positive basis, while the long run storage rate anticipates little to no
basis on the futures curve. Furthermore, the current spot price is higher than the estimated
long-run mean (U0 > µ
∗), and the backwardated futures curve reflects the anticipation that
the spot price will decrease in the future. This is consistent with the model’s mean-reverting
dynamics for the spot price.
In addition, we consider the differences between the model futures curve and the futures
curve generated without considering the timing options. To be precise, let the ‘no certificate’
futures curve ψ(t, Ut, δt;T ) be
ψ(t, Ut;T ) = E[ST |Gt]
= exp
(
e−α(T−t)Ut + µ(1− e−α(T−t)) + σ
2
4µ
(1− e−2α(T−t))
)
, (4.6)
which can be found in (Leung et al., 2016, Sect. 2.2). In Figure 8, we plot the futures curve,
described by ψ(0, U0;Ti) for i = 0 . . . N, using the same fitted parameters from our model
(µ∗, α∗, σ∗) and the initial assumption that exp(U0) = F0, the empirical terminal futures
price. In other words, for the no-certificate case, we take the expiring futures price to be the
spot price, and ignore the entire spot grain market prices. The last assumption means there
is initially zero basis, as would be the case when physical grain is the delivery item.
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Figure 7: Calibrating the XOU Model to the empirical corn futures prices. The x-
axis is time to maturity in months and the y-axis is the price of a bushel of corn
in cents. The ‘no certificate’ curve is taken from equation (4.6). We use the fitted
parameters from the ‘model’ curve as inputs for the ‘no certificate’ curve to illustrate
the premium. Fitted parameters: (left) β∗ = 16.12, γ∗ = 15.08 µ∗ = 4.62, α∗ = 0.058,
and σ∗ = 0.40. Fitted parameters for the rightmost panel are β∗ = 10.75, γ∗ = 15.10,
µ∗ = 5.52, α∗ = 0.10, and σ∗ = 0.12. Other parameters are r = 0.017, and (in cents)
S0 = exp(U0) = {281, 167}, δ∗0 = 106, δ̂ = 55 and c1, c2 = 0.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
time to maturity
300
310
320
330
340
350
360 WHEAT-2005-05-04
empirical
no certificate
model
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
time to maturity
650
700
750
800
850
900 WHEAT-2007-11-23
empirical
no certificate
model
Figure 8: Calibrating XOU model with local storage to the empirical wheat futures
curve. The x-axis is time to maturity in months and the y-axis is the price of a bushel
of wheat in cents. The ‘no certificate’ curve is taken from equation (4.6). We use
the fitted parameters from the ‘model’ curve as inputs for the ‘no certificate’ curve to
illustrate the premium. Fitted parameters: (left) β∗ = 9.98, γ∗ = 11.22 µ∗ = 5.83,
α∗ = 0.08, and σ∗ = 0.14. Fitted parameters for the rightmost panel are β∗ = 7.13,
γ = 14.16, µ∗ = 5.90, α∗ = 0.38, and σ∗ = 0.91. Other parameters are r = 0.017,
Ut = {5.61, 6.65}, δ̂ = 55 and c1, c2 = 0.
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Figure 9: Calibrating the Martingale Model (left) and the XOU Model (right) to the
empirical soybeans futures curve. The x-axis is time to maturity in months and the
y-axis is the price of a bushel of wheat in cents. The ‘no certificate’ curve is taken
from equations (3.16) and (4.6) respectively. The fitted parameters from the ‘model’
curve are used as inputs for the ‘no certificate’ curve to illustrate the premium. Fitted
parameters: (left) ν∗ = −0.44, κ∗ = 0.023, ζ∗ = 0.92, and δ∗0 = 1.42; (right) β∗ = 11.88,
γ∗ = 9.97, µ∗ = 5.91, α∗ = 0.035, and σ∗ = 0.95. Other parameters are r = 0.017,
St = 1004.25, δ̂ = 55 and c1 = c2 = 0.
As shown earlier, the model prices of futures of all maturities with a shipping certificate
dominate the respective contracts without one due to the timing options embedded in the
shipping certificate. Furthermore, the difference increases as the futures maturity lengthens,
indicating that the storage option exerts a more significant price impact over a longer period
of time. In summary, we have shown that the timing options in a shipping certificate are
a crucial component to explain the positive basis. As we have seen, the exponential OU
model is able to capture forward anticipative behaviors of the basis and account for both
backwardated and upwards-sloping futures curves.
We close this section by comparing the empirical calibrations of the Martingale Model
and the XOU Model in Figure 9. While both models are equally capable of estimating
the immediate basis and fitting the empirical futures prices, the value of the timing option
embedded in the shipping certificate is significantly higher under the XOU Model than the
Martingale Model. This can be seen from the spread between the ‘model’ curve (shipping
certificate delivery) and the ‘no certificate’ curve (physical spot delivery) plotted on both
panels. The ‘no certificate’ curve generated from the Martingale Model is much closer to the
fitted ‘model’ curve, whereas a visibly larger gap is observed in the XOU Model. Intuitively,
the XOU Model tends to propagate the basis forward as the market storage rate is assumed
to be positively correlated with the spot price, but the Martingale Model assumes an in-
dependent stochastic (per bushel) storage rate. Therefore, the two models possess distinct
features that address different market conditions, and have different implications to futures
prices with longer maturities.
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Figure 10: Seasonality of the average basis for corn, soybeans, and wheat during 2004–
2010. The basis is highest during the harvest months (August-October) as storage
rates are high due to grain silo capacity constraint. For instance, the average basis
for soybeans exceeds 12% in September. From February to June, the basis tends to
be smaller since the storage costs are lower due to empty grain silos before the next
harvest begins.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have demonstrated that the timing option embedded in the shipping certificate for grains
leads to terminal non-convergence of futures and cash prices. The shipping certificate, by
allowing its owner to choose the cheaper of two possible storage rates, therefore commands a
premium over the physical grain itself. Our modeling approach captures the storage option
of the shipping certificate by solving two optimal timing problems: one to determine the
optimal liquidation strategy for physical grain and another for the optimal exercise strategy
for the shipping certificate.
We have proposed two stochastic diffusion models for the spot grain and storage rate
dynamics, one in which the storage rate process is OU and the spot price less storage costs
is a martingale, and the other where the spot price admits exponential OU dynamics along
with a locally stochastic market storage rate. Under both models, explicit prices are provided
for the shipping certificate and associated futures curve. Furthermore, we fit our models to
empirical data during the periods of observed non-convergence. Our models not only capture
the non-convergence phenomenon, but they also demonstrate adequate fit against the futures
curve data when the market in backwardation or contango.
In order to develop tractable models with analytical solutions that are amenable to inter-
pretation and calibration, we did not consider the seasonality of grain prices, among other
features. To compare the basis over different months of the year, we illustrate in Figure 10
the average basis for all three commodities. As shown, the basis is typically higher during the
fall harvest months (August to October) when available storage capacity is low and market
storage rates are high. This suggests that the value of storage optionality, captured in our
models here, is particularly high in these months. In contrast, the basis is typically smaller
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from the winter through the summer while the grain silos are being emptied before the next
harvest, and thus, storage rates are reduced during the low season.
Overall, both of our proposed models are capable of generating model prices corresponding
to a variety of market situations, such as high/low storage costs, and backwardated/contango
futures curves, and fit well for different commodities. Therefore, the proposed models seem
to have sufficient components and strong economic rationale to reflect and quantify non-
convergence in the grains markets. There is certainly room for incorporating additional
characteristics, such as seasonality and other contractual features, such as quality and delivery
options. However, the relatively small number of traded futures contracts for each commodity
may limit the number of model parameters, and thus, model sophistication.
A better understanding of the price behaviors of commodity futures is also relevant to
broader financial market, especially in the current era of so-called financialization of the
commodity market (see Tang and Xiong (2012)), whereby commodity prices have become
more correlated with the equity market. Moreover, commodity futures also play a role in the
exchange-traded fund (ETF) market since most commodity ETFs are essentially dynamic
portfolios of commodity futures; see Guo and Leung (2015); Leung and Ward (2015), among
others. Therefore, for investors seeking spot exposure through commodity ETFs, any model
which sheds light on the non-convergence phenomenon will affect investment decisions.
While our models have both empirical explanatory power and theoretical foundation, our
results do not rule out the possible scenario called the ‘failure of arbitrage’ in the grain
markets, as suggested by the speculator hypothesis. Nevertheless, alternative theories of
non-convergence can potentially be incorporated into our models. The unique feature of
our models is the embedded double timing option. This should motivate future research
to investigate the valuation of such a timing option under different stochastic storage rate
dynamics. Other directions include adding to futures multiple options, such as the delivery
option, quality option, and location option. Furthermore, we choose our models in this paper
for analytical tractability which give closed-form certificate prices. One can also examine
certificate prices under more complex stochastic models, for example, with stochastic interest
rate, as well as stochastic volatility and jumps in the spot price or storage rate.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs: GBM with Stochastic Storage
6.1.1 Proposition 1
We derive the certificate price by first determining the liquidation value function J(Sτ , δτ )
and then substituting the value to solve the certificate problem V (ST , δT ). After applying
the martingale property of (Mt)t≥0 =
(
e−rtSt −
∫ t
0 δue
−rudu
)
t≥0
, and applying the optional
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sampling theorem, the liquidation value function simplifies to
J(Sτ , δτ ) = e
rτ
(
sup
η∈Tτ,∞
E
[
e−rη(Sη − c2)−
∫ η
τ
δue
−rudu|Fτ
])
= erτ
(
sup
η∈Tτ,∞
E
[
Mη +
∫ η
0
δue
−rudu−
∫ η
τ
δue
−rudu− c2e−rη|Fτ
])
= erτ
(
Mτ +
∫ τ
0
δue
−rudu+ sup
η∈Tτ,∞
E
[−c2e−rη|Fτ ])
= Sτ .
From the last step, we see that η =∞ is optimal. Furthermore, after substituting J(St, δt) =
St into the certificate pricing problem, and again using the fact that Mt is a martingale, we
obtain a solution for V (ST , δT ) which is separable in ST and δT :
V (ST , δT ) = e
rT
(
sup
τ∈TT,∞
E
[
e−rτ (Sτ − c1)−
∫ τ
T
δ̂e−rudu|FT
])
= erT
(
MT +
∫ T
0
δue
−rudu+ sup
τ∈TT,∞
E
[∫ τ
T
(δu − δ̂)e−rudu− c1e−ru|FT
])
= ST + sup
τ∈TT,∞
E
[∫ τ
T
(δu − δ̂)e−r(u−T )du− c1e−r(τ−T )|FT
]
. (6.1)
We denote the second term in (6.1) by P (δT ), where the function P (δ) satisfies the variational
inequality
max
{
LP (δ)− rP (δ) + δ − δ̂,−P − c1
}
= 0,
where L ≡ Lκ,ν,ζ is the infinitesimal generator defined in (3.7). In order to determine P (δ)
and the optimal stopping strategy τ∗, we first conjecture that τ∗ takes the form
τ∗ = inf{t ≥ T : δt ≤ δ∗}
for critical stopping level δ∗ to be determined. In other words, when the market storage rate
δt is sufficiently small, the agent exercises to take advantage of the cheaper market storage
rate, instead of paying the higher certificate rate δ̂. Thus, for δt > δ
∗, we look for the solution
of the ODE LP (δ) − rP (δ) + δ − δ̂ = 0, and for δ ≤ δ∗ we require that P (δ) = −c1. This
leads to the solution to the variational inequality
P (δ) =
[
AH(δ) +
1
κ+ r
(
δ − δ̂ + κ(ν − δ̂)
r
)]
1{δ ≥ δ∗} − c11{δ < δ∗},
along with the boundary conditions: P (δ∗) = −c1 and P ′(δ∗) = 0. The latter is the smooth
pasting condition, which implies that
A = − 1
H ′(δ∗)(κ+ r)
.
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Enforcing these boundary conditions together also yields the optimal exercise level δ∗ in
(3.11).
Consider the function defined from (3.11)
f(δ∗) := δ∗ − H(δ
∗)
H ′(δ∗)
.
First, the properties of H imply that H/H ′ ≥ 0, so that f(δ∗) ≤ δ∗. Taking the limit
as δ∗ → −∞, we have f(−∞) = −∞. Furthermore, under the restriction ζ2 ≤ 2κ, and
examining the terms inside the integrals of H and H ′, namely,
H(δ∗) =
∫ ∞
0
v
r
κ
−1e
√
2κ
ζ2
(x−ν)v− v2
2 dv,
H ′(δ∗) =
∫ ∞
0
v
r
κ
√
2κ
ζ2
e
√
2κ
ζ2
(x−ν)v− v2
2 dv,
we conclude that H/H ′ ≤ 1. Therefore, f(δ∗) ≥ δ∗ − 1, and f(∞) = ∞. Finally, for δ∗ ∈
(−∞,∞), f ′ = HH ′/H ′′ > 0. Therefore, we have
lim
δ∗→−∞
f(δ∗) = −∞, lim
δ∗→∞
f(δ∗) =∞, f ′(δ∗) > 0.
The solution δ∗ to (3.11) is unique.
6.2 Proofs: Exponential OU with Local Stochastic Storage
6.2.1 Proposition 2
We consider a candidate interval type strategy for both τ and η. First, since the certificate
price is monotonically increasing in the spot price, we consider the optimal liquidation time
η∗ to be of the form: η∗ = inf{t ≥ τ∗ : Ut ≥ u∗}. In the liquidation problem represented by J ,
we hold the commodity until the storage cost δt, which is increasing in the commodity price
Ut, is sufficiently large relative to the commodity price. We solve a variational inequality
for the value function J(u) and match the boundary condition at u∗ to get the solution.
Assuming the conjectured form for η∗, J(u) satisfies{
LJ(u)− rJ(u) = βu+ δ if u < u∗,
J(u) = eu − c2 if u ≥ u∗,
where L ≡ Lα,µ,σ is the infinitesimal generator defined in (3.7). We apply the continuity and
smooth pasting conditions to J(u), and get
J(u∗) = eu
∗ − c2, J ′(u∗) = eu∗ ,
This gives the solution (4.3) with u∗ satisfying
f(u∗) =
eu
∗
+ β/(α+ r)
H ′(u∗)
H(u∗)− 1
α+ r
[
βu∗ + γ +
α(βµ+ γ)
r
]
− eu∗ + c2 = 0.
When σ <
√
2α, the level u∗ admits a unique solution. First we can write
f(u∗) = eu
∗
(
H(u∗)
H ′(u∗)
− 1
)
+
β
α+ r
(
H(u∗)
H ′(u∗)
− u∗
)
+ C,
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for some constant C not depending on u∗. Since HH′ ≤ 1 then f(u∗) ≤ βα+r (1 − u∗) +
C so limu∗→∞ f(u∗) = −∞. Also, since HH′ ≥ 0, then f(u∗) ≥ −eu
∗ − βα+ru∗ + C so
limu∗→−∞ f(u∗) =∞. Finally, we can look at
f ′(u∗) = −H(u
∗)
H ′(u∗)
[
eu
∗
(
H ′′(u∗)
H ′(u∗)
− 1
)
+
β
α+ r
H ′′(u∗)
H ′(u∗)
]
.
Using similar arguments as from the previous appendix, we canshow H
′′
H′ ≥ 1, so f ′(u∗) ≤
− H(u∗)H′(u∗) αα+r < 0 ∀u∗ ∈ R. To recap, we have shown that
lim
u∗→−∞ f(u
∗) =∞, lim
u∗→∞ f(u
∗) = −∞, f ′(u∗) < 0,
so our solution u∗ is unique.
On the other hand, in the exercise problem V , the optimal strategy τ∗ takes the form
τ∗ = inf{t ≥ T : Ut ≤ u∗∗ or Ut ≥ u∗∗},
In other words, hold the commodity until either (i) the storage cost is at or lower than u∗∗
where the agent exercises, or (ii) the commodity price is reaches the upper level u∗∗ at which
the agent exercises and liquidates. As such, the value function satisfies
V (u) = eu − c1 − c2 if u > u∗∗,
LV (u)− rV (u) = δ̂ if u∗∗ ≤ u ≤ u∗∗,
V (u) = AH(u)− 1α+r
[
βu+ δ + α(βµ+δ)r
]
− c1 if u < u∗∗.
The boundary conditions for u∗∗ and u∗∗ are
V (u∗∗) = eu
∗∗ − c1 − c2, V (u∗∗) = J(u∗∗) = AH(u∗∗)− 1
α+ r
[
βu∗∗ + δ +
α(βµ+ δ)
r
]
− c1,
V ′(u∗∗) = eu
∗∗
, V ′(u∗∗) = J ′(u∗∗) = AH ′(u∗∗)− β
α+ r
.
We match the boundary conditions at u∗∗ and u∗∗ to get the solution (4.4).
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